Abstract: |
Family firms have attracted the attention of researchers, documenting that these firms care more for preservation, long-term prosperity, and the reputation of the controlling family than for short-term profitability. Family firms also act more cautiously and take fewer risks. Hence, they are less likely to engage in earnings manipulation, exhibit lower abnormal accruals and fewer restatements, all indicating a better quality of financial reporting. We focus on an additional dimension of reporting quality by examining the external and internal audit. When auditors perceive reporting quality to be low, they may increase audit hours, charge higher hourly rates, or both. However, as audit hours are not available for US and European firms, most studies use audit fees as a measure of audit effort, e.g., Ghosh and Tang (2015) find that auditors charge family firms lower audit fees than non-family firms, but their study is silent on the effect of family ownership on audit hours and hourly rates. Another important element in determining external audit scope is internal controls. Stronger internal controls moderate earnings management, so if family firms implement stronger controls than non-family firms, that may reduce the amount of work and the riskiness for the external auditors. However, prior literature reports mixed evidence on internal controls in family firms.
Our analysis is based on data from all publicly listed firms on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in Israel from 2006 to 2018. During this period, public firms were required to disclose the total remuneration paid to external auditors and the work hours invested by the auditors. Both figures enable a calculation of auditors’ hourly rates. In addition, public firms must report the scope of employment of their internal auditors and detail any family relationships between stakeholders, directors, and managers.
We show that family firms face lower audit fees compared with non-family firms. Next, we separate fees to hours and rates. We find that auditors charge lower hourly rates for family firms than for non-family firms. As auditors’ rates reflect their risk premia, this finding suggests that auditors perceive family firms as less risky. Analyzing audit hours, we do not find a significant difference between the number of audit hours in family and non-family engagements. Taken together, our findings suggest that it is the billing rate, rather than the number of hours, which drives down the audit fees paid by family firms. Additionally, we find that lower rates are concentrated in family firms in which a family member serves as the chief executive officer or other type of top manager. Conversely, family firms with no direct involvement of the family do not record lower rates (nor audit hours) compared with non-family firms. Hence, the special attention given to preservation, long-term prosperity and reputation occurs mainly when the family is actively involved in managing the firm.
Next, we document that family ownership does not significantly affect internal audit hours. However, firms managed by family members record fewer internal auditing hours. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that family management significantly magnifies the special characteristics of family firms. Finally, we find that family firms have higher accrual quality than non-family firms, suggesting that reporting quality of family firms is not damaged because of the lower efforts invested in it. |